We empirically analyze the costs and benefits of financial regulation based on a survey of 76 insurers from Austria, Germany and Switzerland. Our analysis includes both established and new empirical measures for regulatory costs and benefits. This is the first paper that takes costs and benefits combined into account using a latent class regression with covariates. Another feature of this paper is that it analyzes regulatory costs and benefits not only on an industry level, but also at the company level. This allows us to empirically test fundamental principles of financial regulation such as proportionality: the intensity of regulation should reflect the firm-specific amount and complexity of the risk taken. Our empirical findings do not support the proportionality principle; for example, regulatory costs cannot be explained by differences in business complexity. One potential policy implication is that the proportionality principle needs to be more carefully applied to financial regulation.
Introduction
In light of the growing amount and complexity of regulation in the financial sector (e.g., additional rules for systemically important financial institutions, Basel III, Solvency II), the costs and benefits of financial regulation is a highly relevant and timely topic. One major trend in this context is the shift from simple rules-based solvency measures towards more complex risk-based capital measures, involving the use of internal risk models and the new philosophy of principalbased regulation.
1 One fundamental principal of new insurance regulation is proportionality, meaning that regulatory requirements and their enforcement should take into account the nature, scale and complexity of an insurer's risk.
Although the increasing amount and complexity of regulation is often cited as most important threat to the insurance sector (e.g., I.VW, 2010; PwC, 2011 PwC, , 2013 and Black Rock, 2013) , there is almost no literature on the costs and benefits of insurance regulation. This is most likely due to the considerable difficulty of measuring the costs and benefits. 2 A few researchers have attempted to assess regulatory costs and benefits for the entire financial services sector, especially using survey methods. 3 Other researchers have assessed the costs and benefits of regulation using micro-economic equilibrium models and derive welfare implications from new insurance regulation. 4 We add to this strand of literature by empirically assessing the effectiveness of regulation on the insurance industry employing a sample of 76 insurers from Austria, Germany and Switzerland. Previous studies only estimate costs and benefits for the whole finance or insurance 1 An example in Europe is the principal-based Swiss Solvency Test (SST), introduced in 2006 and mandatory since 2011. Another example is Solvency II, which will be implemented by 2016 (Financial Times, 2013) for all countries in the European Union. In the US the solvency modernization initiative is an ongoing reform discussion with respect to the risk-based capital standards (e.g., Klein, 2012) .
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See Posner and Weyl (2013) who conceptually outline requirements for the measurement of benefits and costs in financial regulation.
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For example, Franks, Schaefer and Staunton (1997) empirically analyze the direct and indirect costs of financial regulation in the UK and compare the direct costs with those from the US and France. For insurance, Ernst & Young (2011) have conducted a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of Solvency II in the UK by evaluating the impact of Solvency II on the required capital of insurance companies; they also estimate the implementing and compliance costs of Solvency II as well as the impact of the new regulatory regime on the financial markets in the UK. 4 See, for example, Hoy (2006) about the impact of restricting the factors for risk classification, Dong, Gründl and Schlütter (2013) regarding the effects of guarantee funds and Sass and Seifried (2014) regarding the consequences of unisex tariffs. In addition, Lorson, Schmeiser and Wagner (2012) evaluate the policyholders' willingness to pay for stricter regulation and compare it with the costs of Solvency II estimated by previous studies.
industry. We go one step further and analyze these questions at the level of the individual company. In addition, this is the first paper to analyze both costs and benefits. For this purpose, we first regress company characteristics on costs and benefits of regulation individually. Second, we take costs and benefits combined into account by using a latent class regression model with covariates. In a first step, different latent classes are generated and the likelihood of the insurers belonging to a certain class is estimated. Therefore, different insurer profiles regarding costs and benefits are made explicit. In a second step, the ways in which insurer characteristics influence latent class affiliation and their cost-benefit profiles are estimated. Our results thus draw a more differentiated picture than previous research has, and identify the characteristics that can determine if an insurer is more positively or negatively affected by regulation than its peers are.
Our results show that differences in business complexity cannot explain the costs of regulation. In addition, small insurers who compare regulatory costs relative to premium income have higher costs than large insurers. The principal of proportionality thus does not work well. A second important result is that stock insurers exhibit lower regulatory costs than mutuals.
Consequently, mutuals are not only at a disadvantage in relation to stocks due to their limited access to the capital markets (Harrington and Niehaus, 2002; Viswanathan and Cummins, 2003) , but also because of regulatory requirements (Zanjani, 2007) . Finally, the latent class regression identifies two groups of companies with distinct perception of costs and benefits of regulation:
The "balanced" insurers vs. the "pessimistic" ones. In general, Swiss insurers tend to belong to the "balanced" class and Austrian as well as German insurers to the "pessimistic" class.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on costs and benefits of financial regulation and how they are measured. Our understanding of the terms 'costs' and 'benefits' of regulation for insurance companies is also discussed. The hypotheses tested in this paper and the variables we use to measure 'costs' and 'benefits' are explained in Section 3. The data and methods used in this paper are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results and is divided into three parts considering the costs, the benefits and their combination. Section 6 concludes and discusses potential policy implications.
Costs and Benefits of Financial Regulation
In principle, the costs and benefits of regulation can be classified along two dimensions: a) if costs and benefits are direct or indirect and b) if costs and benefits are due to implementation of new regulation or due to compliance with existing regulation. Both distinctions are far from trivial, since they result in manifold allocation problems. Franks, Schaefer and Staunton (1997) define direct costs as all costs necessary to develop, enact and supervise regulation. Indirect costs are all costs market participants and third parties have to bear (including opportunity costs). 5 Another understanding is presented in a report commissioned by the Financial Services Authority (FSA): direct costs are those that can clearly be attributed to a particular business activity (Deloitte 2006, p. 64) . All other costs are understood to be indirect. 6 For example, the labor costs of employees responsible for documentation requirements of a certain business line would be direct costs. In contrast, increased property expenditures which cannot be clearly assigned to a business line would be indirect costs. Elliehausen (1998, p. 3) defines implementation costs as one-time costs of making changes to conform to the requirements of a regulation. The definition includes a broad range of set-up costs from legal and advisory expenses for interpreting and communicating the new regulation to expenses for new IT systems. Compliance costs are defined as "… the recurring costs of performing activities required by a regulation." For example, expenses for preparing reports for the regulator and opportunity costs fall into this category.
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Most of the literature has classified the costs of regulation, but has not discussed its potential benefits. In this paper we measure both the costs and the benefits of regulation. While the dividing rule in Franks, Schaefer and Staunton (1997) is government vs. market participants/third parties, the dividing rule in Deloitte (2006) is assignable to business activities vs. non-assignable.
7 Deloitte (2006, p. 8 ) applies a similar classification and differentiates between one-off and ongoing costs in determining the costs of regulation for UK financial services companies. However, they report that for many companies a clear distinction between one-off and ongoing costs is difficult. A study by the CEA (2007, p. 4) focuses only on the administrative costs due to Solvency II and differentiates initial and ongoing administrative costs as well. For a further example, see Lorson, Schmeiser and Wagner (2012, p. 146 Table 2 we present these results). Empirical research will always be able to model only parts of the regulatory costs and benefits and will need proxies to measure the impact of regulation.
Costs Benefits
 (Lorson, Schmeiser and Wagner, 2012) . A simultaneous analysis is only 8
In order to mitigate the allocation problem, we additionally perform robustness tests without differentiating between direct and indirect costs. Results can be provided upon request.
9 Bailit et al. (1985) show in a study for the US that extended dental insurance coverage improves oral health in a society especially for people under 35 and people with poor oral health. However, Brennan, Anikeeva and Teusner (2013) find mixed results in a study for Australia. Dental insurance is related to the likelihood of visiting a dentist, but not directly to oral health. For Germany and Switzerland, Staehle and Kerschbaum (2004) show that in contrast to common perception, the extent of insurance coverage cannot explain oral health. 10 For example, Walters et al. (2012) analyze the impact of crop insurance in the United States on the environment.
They find that insurance coverage influences production decisions, but the general impact on the environment seems to be small. However, insurance contract characteristics can explain adverse and beneficial effects on the environment. For instance, high coverage insurance leads to less adverse effects than low coverage contracts. 11 See, for example, Franks, Schaefer and Staunton (1997) and Deloitte (2006) who point out that for companies it is difficult to consider a situation in which a certain regulatory requirement is absent for all market participants. Normally, companies do not take into account that the abolition of regulation also affects their competitors.
possible by comparing jurisdictions, but this requires controlling for country differences (as we do in this paper). Moreover, unbiased data generation and analysis might be difficult since parties affected by regulation might have a strong interest in a certain outcome and lobby for a certain result of the cost-benefit analysis (CBA). For example, the regulated companies have an incentive to increase the reported compliance costs by allocating elements that would also exist without regulation (e.g., IT systems for financial reporting). Cochrane (2014) discusses this argument in detail and points out the danger of regulatory capture, that is, analyses are guided by the interests of lobbying groups and not by the public interest, if CBA becoming mandatory. Becker (2000) likewise acknowledges the problem, but argues that it is minor since the most adversely affected groups invest most in lobbying and therefore the CBA is still useful. In this paper, regulatory capture is not an issue, since up-to-date CBA are not mandatory in Austria, Germany or Switzerland. Evaluation of the compliance costs of US property-liability insurers:  Economies of scale can be observed: size has a negative impact on compliance costs relative to premium income  The claims-cost-expense ratio can explain the share of business written in an restrictive regulatory environment  Salary expenses can explain number of states in which the insurer at hand is active  The licensing costs for insurers alone result in roughly $4.5 bn compliance costs for the US property-liability insurance industry (costs per license ≈ $100,000; number of multi-state insurers ≈ 3,000; average number of states a multi-state insurer is doing business in ≈ 15) Downs and Sommer (1999) Propertyliability insurers Quantitative Study (Econometrical methods) Risk-taking approximated by stock market based risk measures Analysis of the impact of US guaranty funds on insurance company's risk-taking:  Insider ownership can explain increased risk-taking which is consistent with the risk-subsidy hypothesis (guaranty funds lead to increased risktaking). The theoretical background is that a guaranty fund represents a put option for the shareholder, but risk-taking should only increase if the management is invested in the company as well since human capital cannot be diversified and therefore according to the principal-agent theory management should have no interest in increased risk-taking.  Relationship between insider ownership and risk-taking decreases for very high levels of insider ownership and therefore the monitoring hypothesis (introduction of guaranty funds increases monitoring of risk-taking due to the fact that solvent insurance companies have to pay ex post for insolvent insurers) cannot be totally rejected Rees and Kessner (1999) Distance to default (zscore)
Cross-country study on the relation of an insurer insolvency probability (measured by the z-score) and regulatory policies (measured by an index based on the IAIS database):  Powerful regulators reduce the probability of insolvency  Technical provisions regulation reduces the probability of insolvency  Investment regulation reduces the probability of insolvency  Satisfaction with the regulator recovered after it decreased in 2010 due to increased regulation in the aftermath of the financial crisis  37% consider the regulator as ineffective, 24% as effective  The main consequences of regulation are: higher costs (reported by 74% of the participants), lower profit margins (38%) and creation of disadvantages towards foreign competitors (32%)  Industry recommends that regulation's intensity should be proportional to risk Sass and Seifried (2014) Life and nonlife insurers, reinsurers and policyholders Quantitative Study (Theoretical modelling)  Premium levels  Welfare (Utility function of policyholders and insurers wealth)
Estimation of the effect of unisex tariffs in life insurance on social welfare. For the analysis an insurance market model is developed which is an extension of the one by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) :  Unisex tariffs lead to small insurance premium reductions for high-risk individuals and substantial premium increases for low-risk individuals  In competitive markets unisex tariffs reduce welfare; in monopolistic markets unisex tariffs can increase welfare, but regulation to enhance competitive markets would increase welfare even more depending on the sub-sector a financial company has to face different levels of stringency in regulation as shown by Franks, Schaefer and Staunton (1997) . In addition, Cummins, Harrington and Niehaus (1994) , Skipper and Klein (2000) and Holzmüller (2009) emphasize that capital requirements should be set according to the risk profile of an insurer and support in this way the proportionality principle. Therefore, if regulation requirements differ in stringency and scope according to certain company characteristics, we argue, the costs and benefits of regulation should also vary according to these characteristics. Table 3 gives an overview of the hypotheses we test in this paper. Hypothesis H1 (with three sub hypotheses) is set up to test the proportionality principle and hypothesis H2 tests for differences in organizational form. While the discussion of the proportionality principle focuses on the cost of regulation, we also include the benefits of regulation in the discussion of the organizational form as well as in the additional tests we present in the empirical part. 16 In this paper we focus on the proportionality principle in the context of insurance. A more general discussion of the proportionality principle from a juridical perspective is given by Harbo (2010) . The European Court of Justice, for example, applies the principle by testing if a certain legislative or administrative action is (a) suitable to achieve the stated goals, (b) is necessary to achieve the goals and (c) the measure is appropriate, that is, the burden for affected parties is reasonable in a given context. Consequently, also the costs of regulation should be less for reinsurers than for primary insurers.
Hypotheses
With Hypothesis 2 we want to add a new empirical test to the discussion about the organizational forms of insurance companies: stocks vs. mutuals. Previous studies (e.g., Harrington and Niehaus, 2002; Viswanathan and Cummins, 2003) On the one hand, an argument for higher regulation costs of stock market companies is that listed companies are subject to much more transparency and disclosure requirements, which do not apply to mutual companies (see, e.g., internal control weakness reporting under the SarbanesOxley Act as described by Su, Zhao and Zhou, 2014) . This argument is in line with the 18 An example is Article 2 (1a) of the directive on markets in financial instruments by the European Parliament and European Council (2004) which is only relevant for primary insurers and not for reinsurers. In addition, rate regulation in personal lines of property-liability insurance in the U.S. can be mentioned as described by Cummins (2001) . In Switzerland, Article 35(1) of the insurance supervision act by the Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation (2013) shows that reinsurers are less regulated than primary insures. It specifies that several articles of the legislative act are relevant for primary insurers, but not for reinsurers. For example, generally a Swiss insurance portfolio can only be transferred to a third party if the regulator approves the transaction. An exception is the transaction of a pure reinsurance portfolio which needs not to be approved. 19 This argument is in line with Skipper and Klein (2000, p. 493) who write: "Governments regulate insurance purchased by individuals more stringently than insurance purchased by businesses and other organizations because of the greater information problems for individuals. Reinsurance historically has been subject to minimal regulatory oversight because both buyers and sellers are usually well informed." entrenchment hypothesis by He and Sommer (2011) which states that for mutuals there are fewer control mechanisms available than for stock companies. On the other hand, for the US, Zanjani (2007) shows that the historical decline of the number of life insurance mutuals in the 20 th century was significantly influenced by regulation. He shows that the stringency of regulation itself has no impact on the choice of organizational form. Rather initial capital requirements define the popularity of mutuals as the preferred organizational form. If high levels of capital are required by regulation to found a life insurer it can be observed that a stock company is the preferred organizational form. This finding follows economic intuition since raising capital is easier for stocks than for mutuals.
In addition to the two main hypotheses regarding the proportionality principle and the organizational form, we control for the size of the insurer, its business focus and its country of origin. We control for size since certain regulations -as reporting requirements -have to be fulfilled by all insurers regardless of their size, so the relative burden for small insures should be higher than for large ones. Consequently, the relation between costs and benefits should be seen more positively by large insurers. 20 In addition, we control if the insurer is mainly active in life or non-life insurance. We expect that life and non-life insurers face different costs of regulation given that different regulations need to be followed. In addition, there are different levels of market discipline in life and non-life insurance as shown by Eling and Schmit (2012) , which should also be considered by regulation. An example in which these differences are indeed considered are the guidance papers about technical provisions for life and non-life insurance (FINMA, 2008a (FINMA, , 2008b Table 2 ) costs for the implementation of Solvency II can be quite substantial. Furthermore, according to international statistics there is in general more economic freedom for businesses in Switzerland and the regulatory framework is considered to 20 A common misunderstanding is to relate size to the proportionality principle. However, the proportionality principle solely relates to the risk of an insurer and size is not necessarily an indicator of risk. See, for example, IAIS (2011, p. 9) and Kessler (2013, p. 9 ).
be of higher quality than in Austria and Germany. 21 We thus expect to see country differences between Switzerland vs. Austria/Germany, both in the evaluation of costs and benefits.
Data and Methodology
The empirical data used in this study was created from an industry study which was conducted on behalf of the Swiss Insurance Association. In order to estimate regulatory costs and benefits, a survey was sent to the CFOs of all insurance companies registered at the national regulator in Austria, Germany and Switzerland in October 2013. The survey was sent to 543 companies, of which 76 participated. This questionnaire is available upon request.
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In the market survey, regulation comprises all laws, directives and guidelines which must be met by insurers due to government requirements. Costs and benefits of regulation for insurers are defined as all consequences of regulation -either direct or indirect. Government costs and noneconomic costs and benefits are not covered. Furthermore, implementation costs are distinguished from compliance costs. On the benefits side, the benefits for policyholder protection, for financial stability and the impact on the attractiveness of the business location are evaluated.
The questionnaire starts with general questions about the insurance company. 23 The major part consists of questions about the perceived costs and benefits of insurance regulation. In this context, perceived means that costs and benefits can be rated on a scale with five options: high, rather high, medium, rather low or low. We ask for the situation today, five years ago and the situation that is expected in five years. Based on this section we create ordinal variables about costs and benefits over time. Perceived costs and benefits are based on the subjective view of the 21 For a comparison of the business environments in several countries see Heritage Foundation (2014) . Our assessment is based on the Index of Economic Freedom for 2013. For a comparison of the quality of the regulatory frameworks in several countries, see World Bank (2013). Our evaluation is based on the information about regulatory quality used to generate the Worldwide Governance Indicator. The latest information is from 2012. 22 The results thus represent the perspective of the industry, which might raise questions about data bias and industry influence. In order to avoid this potential data bias, different measures for costs of regulation are considered (actual and perceived costs). Moreover, the cross-country setting allows us to compare the evaluation among different countries. The industry was involved to gather the analyzed data, but not in preparation of this paper. 23 The chosen categories regarding costs and benefits that have to be assessed by the survey participants are based on Skipper and Kwon (2007, p. 627) . The general design of the questionnaire follows loosely the one by SECO (2012).
respondent; we also ask the respondents to report the actual costs, which might be seen as a second more objective measure. We thus ask for the actual number of full-time employees committed to existing regulation and the implementing of new requirements. Moreover, we asked the participants to report their actual external costs for compliance with existing regulation and for implementing new requirements. Based on this information, we generate an aggregate cost measure, where we combine the different cost measures. 24 An overview of the variables is shown in Table 4 . 24 In order to calculate the variables Costs Aggregated , Costs Implementation , and Costs Compliance we consider the external costs as reported in the survey and add the internal costs. Since the internal costs are measured in numbers of employees we calculate first the equivalent labor costs. The monthly labor costs are based on the number of employees (full-time equivalents) and calculated as follows. Per country we multiply the "mean nominal hourly labour cost per employee" with the "mean weekly hours actually worked per employee" as reported by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as of 2010 for Austria, Germany and Switzerland. In order to derive the monthly costs we multiply the resulting figure with 4.34. 27 We use least square regressions to estimate the model since other regression methods do not provide additional benefits. We do not use stepwise regressions since our model is based on theoretical reasoning and we only consider a few independent variables. Furthermore, we do not consider fixed effects since there are no intragroup differences. One could argue that the data is censored and a tobit regression might be useful. However, initial tests show that no estimated dependent variables are censored and therefore we do not further employed the methodology. 28 Literature does not agree on the largest acceptable value of the variance inflation factor under the assumption that multicollinearity is not a concern. Kleinbaum et al. (2008, p. 310 ) suggest 10 as an upper limit and therefore we believe a maximum variance inflation factor of 2.2, as in our case, is commonly acceptable. 29 As a further robustness test we also employed a logit function as linking function. The results do not provide any further insights and can be provided upon request. 30 Since the latent class analysis is applicable only to categorical data we transform the size variable into a categorical variable form 1 to 3 according to the insurers' quantile in the sample. In addition, we transformed the other independent variables from a scale from 1 to 5 to a scale from 1 to 3. This is necessary since otherwise the number of potential latent classes would be limited to two considering our data. We perform the latent regression so, we estimate the explanatory power of the independent variables on the class affiliation. For the analysis we employ the following log-likelihood function:
The log-likelihood term ln is maximized with respect to the class-conditional outcome (1977) is used.
Empirical Results

Actual Costs
We first discuss the results for the actual costs, that is equation (1) for the compliance, the implementation and the aggregated costs. In Table 5 the costs numbers include both internal and external costs. Results where internal and external costs are separated are available upon request.
model using the poLCA package in R. For further information about the methodology see Linzer and Lewis (2011) and for an example of its application to finance, see Guerrero, Egea and González (2007) . The variable Size is significant in all models at a 1% confidence level. The algebraic sign of the coefficient of the size variable is positive and less than 1. 32 This indicates that costs increase underproportionally compared with the size of the company, which suggests that there are economies of scale regarding costs of regulation for insurance companies. 33 Big insurance companies have in total higher regulation costs than small insurers, but in relation to their size regulatory costs are lower. These findings are in line with economic intuition and with Grace and Klein (1999) , Deloitte (2006) as well as Europe Economics (2010). As mentioned in Table 2 , Grace and Klein (1999) evaluate the explanatory impact of the stringency of the regulatory environment on different expense ratios (total expenses/premiums written, claims costs/premiums written, licenses & fees/premiums written and salary expenses/premiums written). In addition they control for size and report a significantly negative impact of size on each expense ratio.
Deloitte (2006) Finally, Europe Economics (2010) report that relative to their size, large insurers have to bear lower compliance and implementation costs than small insurers regarding MiFID regulation.
The hypothesis regarding the organizational form is supported by the results shown in Table 6 .
The variable Stock is at least significant at a 10% confidence level in models 1 and 4 regarding aggregated costs and in models 2 and 5 regarding compliance costs. In addition, the coefficients are negative. This suggests that stock companies have lower regulatory costs to bear than mutual companies. In models 3 and 6 regarding implementation costs the coefficients for the Stock variables are not significant. That could imply that past regulation discriminated against mutuals but not against current regulatory initiatives. The control variables Life and Swiss are not significant in any model.
would only affect external compliance costs. Implementation costs and internal costs do not include fees issued by the regulator. 32 If the costs model is transformed into a "costs-relative-to-size-model" only the constant changes and the coefficient for the size variable turns negative. The reason for this pattern is that both dependent variables are logarithmized and therefore both regression models are very similar. As a robustness test we performed the analysis nevertheless and found that size has a strongly significant negative impact on costs relative to premium income as well. Results are available upon request. 33 Since both the dependent variable and the variable Size are logarithmized the coefficient of the Size variable determines the non-linear relationship between the companies' size and regulatory costs. Model specifications which assume a linear relationship result in a worse model fit.
Perceived Costs
Results regarding the perceived costs of regulation are shown in Table 7 . The perception of current costs (models 1 and 4), the perception of the costs development over the last five years (models 2 and 5) as well as the expected development of costs within the next five years (models 3 and 7) are analyzed. No variable regarding the proportionality principle is significant in any model. This can be interpreted as further evidence that the proportionality hypothesis has to be rejected. Insurers conducting risky business activities do not perceive costs as higher than their peers -neither current, nor past or future costs.
In models 1, 2, 4 and 5, only the coefficients for the variable Stock are significant at a 1% expect the costs to remain at a relative high level. In this context, we also see that non-life insurers expect more severe costs developments in the future than life insurers. An explanation could be that especially in credit insurance, more stringent regulation is expected. The expected increase in stringency of regulation is also given as an explanation for the currently high percentage of run-off portfolios in this line of business, as reported by Eling and Pankoke (2013b) .
A comparison of the analyses regarding the actual and perceived costs shows that the results are consistent. Table 6 and Table 7 both indicate that the proportionality hypothesis can be rejected and provide evidence for the hypothesis regarding the organizational form. The main difference in the results is that the actual costs analysis reveals economies of scale regarding costs of regulation. In contrast, the Size variable in the perceived costs analysis has no explanatory power on the perception of costs. Given the lack of proportionality and the concerns about the 34 An example of a law only applicable to stocks is the German Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG). Its goal is to enhance corporate governance in German companies. It requires the establishment of a risk management system and the disclosure of certain information in annual reports. 35 The results have to be interpreted with caution since the pseudo-R2 figures are low and therefore the goodness of fit of the models can be doubted. Models 3 and 6 which are acceptable according to pseudo-R2 figures show no significant explanatory power of the variable Stock. In these models the variables Life and Swiss are negative and significant at a confidence level of 5% and 10% respectively. As pseudo-R2 we report the Nagelkerke information criterion. Figures above 0.2 indicate that the goodness of fit of the model is acceptable. See, for example, Backhaus et al. (2006, p. 456). amount of regulation which is especially often raised by the smaller insurers, we expected a negative link; smaller insurers perceive the burden of regulation as higher. This expectation is, however, not confirmed by our data.
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Perceived Benefits
Results regarding the perceived benefits of insurance regulation are shown in Table 8 . We analyze the explanatory power of insurer characteristics on the perceived benefits regarding the general public (models 1 and 4), policyholders (models 2 and 5) as well as on the attractiveness of the business location (models 3 and 6). 36 Further analyses of the differences between actual and perceived costs reveal that for most insurers the perception of costs is in proportion to actual costs. We find that deviations between actual and perceived costs can be explained by the companies' size. Large companies tend to perceive their regulatory costs as high, although, their actual costs relative to premium income are in comparison with other insurers rather low. We think this result is due to the fact that large insurers benchmark themselves only with their peers regarding size and do not consider smaller insurers only consider insurers which are potential competitors. When thinking about regulatory costs, very small insurers and their regulatory burden are simply not the focus. Results can be provided upon request.
The results provide no further support for the hypothesis regarding the organizational form. In all models the Stock variable has no significant explanatory power. The variables Diversified, International, Primary, Risk Proportionality, Size and Life are not significant in most models. Only the coefficients in model 3 for International and Primary are significant at a 1% respectively 5% level and negative. In case of the International variable in model 3 we interpret the result as follows.
As mentioned in Section 5.1, costs of the regulator seem to be higher in Europe than elsewhere.
In contrast to national insurers, international active insurers realize this 37 and report that the attractiveness of the business location is suffering because of costly regulation. In model 3 the variable Primary also has significant negative explanatory power. This means reinsurers have a more positive view of the impact of regulation on the attractiveness of the business location than primary insurers do. This finding is consistent with economic reality that regulatory concerns are especially important for reinsurers. For example, Bermuda turned into a reinsurance hub next to the USA, the UK, Germany and Switzerland mainly because of tax advantages and pragmatic regulation (see, e.g. Holzheu and Lechner, 2007) .
The variable Swiss is significant at least at a 10% confidence level in all models. However, the interpretation should focus mainly on models 1, 3 and 4 since in all other models the pseudo-R2
figures are below 0.2. In general, Swiss insurers evaluate the benefits of regulation for the public and the business location more highly than do their Austrian and German peers. On the one hand, this can be attributed to a higher quality of the Swiss regulatory framework as reported by the World Bank (2013) and Heritage Foundation (2014) . On the other hand, the ongoing discussion about Solvency II and its delayed introduction could cause the benefits of regulation to be considered as lower at the moment by the insurance industry in the European Union.
Perceived Costs and Benefits
We take costs and benefits combined into account by employing a latent class regression with covariates. In a first step the insurers have to be clustered along latent classes. Table 9 : Goodness of fit criteria regarding latent class selection Figure 1 shows the class-conditional probabilities for insurers to have a certain variable manifestation given they belong to class one or two. In this way, the composition of each class is illustrated. For example, an insurer assigned to class one has a 10% probability to rate current costs as very low (represented by 1), a 20% probability to rate them medium (represented by 2) and a 70% probability for a high rating (represented by 3). 38 For a further discussion of the selection of the number of classes in a latent class analysis, see Linzer and Lewis (2006) .
Figure 1 reveals that to both classes a high percentage of insurers is attributed which rates the perceived costs for regulation as rather high. However, insurers which rate the perceived costs as low or medium fall mainly into class one: 30% of the insurers in class one rate current costs as low or medium in contrast to 22% in class two. Regarding past costs the figures are 7% for class one, 4% for class two, and 16% and 0% with respect to future costs. For perceived benefits the class compositions are clearer. In class one over 90% of the insurers rate the benefits regarding the public, policyholders and the business location as medium or high. In contrast, in class two over 40% of the insurers rate the benefits as low or medium.
The class assignments can thus be interpreted as information about the insurer's profile. Class one insurers in general have a positive view of regulation. The costs for regulation are rather high, but provide many benefits for a variety of stakeholders. We call companies belonging to class one "balanced" insurers. In contrast, class two seems two represent insurers with a negative view of regulation. The costs for regulation are very high and the benefits rather low. Especially they have a very unfavorable view of regulation with respect to the business location. These companies we call "pessimistic" insurers. In our sample 58% would be balanced "insurers" and 42% "pessimistic" ones. This result seems reasonable, since the Practitioner Panel (2013) reports for the UK that 37% of all financial services companies consider the regulator as ineffective.
After clustering the insurers in two latent classes and interpreting these clusters in a second step, the impact of independent variables on class assignments can be analyzed. Table 10 shows the model coefficients for class two of the independent variables because by default the coefficients for class one are set to zero. In addition, goodness of fit criteria are shown. 39 It can be seen that the model fit indeed increases when additional variables are used. BIC decreases from 514 to 490
and AIC from 463 to 427. Furthermore, the variable Swiss reduces the probability of an insurer being assigned to class two at a significant level of 1%. No other variables have significant impact on the probabilities for class assignments of the insurers. 39 In order to illustrate the explanatory effect of the variables, we also calculated the conditional predicted probabilities for latent classes which are available upon request. Table 10 : Parameter and goodness of fit criteria estimation of latent class model with covariates for class 2. By default the coefficients for class one are set to zero. ***,** and * indicate, respectively, the 1%, 5%
and 10% confidence levels. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Taking perceived costs and benefits combined into account gives neither reason to support nor to reject the proportionality hypothesis or the hypothesis regarding the organizational form.
Insurers can be clustered according to their overall view of regulation, but variables regarding the risk profile and the organizational form have no impact on this general view. In addition, the hypotheses focus on costs, but the clustering of the insurers is based mainly on the perception of benefits -the distribution of costs is similar in both classes.
An interesting finding of the latent class regression is that the country of origin plays a crucial role. Swiss companies seem to have a much better view of regulation than their Austrian and German peers. It seems that costs are perceived in both jurisdictions as rather high, but in Switzerland the high regulation is justified by high benefits for all stakeholders. This is in line with our initial reasoning that the business environment in Switzerland is more open than in Austria and Germany.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Cost-benefit analyses of financial regulation, if at all, are conducted mostly for the banking industry (e.g., Elliehausen, 1998) . The little material that exists on insurance typically analyzes the cost side without discussing the benefits of regulation. This paper targets this gap in the literature and evaluates both costs and benefits of insurance regulation. In addition, this paper focuses not only on costs and benefits individually, but takes costs and benefits combined into account by employing a latent class regression with covariates. The analysis is based on data from 76 insurance companies in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. Result is consistent with Zanjani (2007) and extends, for example, Harrington and Niehaus (2002) as well as Viswanathan and Cummins (2003) . The proportionality hypothesis (regulation intensity increases with risk and complexity of the insurer) must be rejected. Neither the analysis regarding actual costs nor the one about perceived costs provides any evidence that the proportionality principle has been implemented in current regulation. In contrast, the size of an insurer has a significant impact on costs of regulation. Small insurers incur higher costs relative to yearly premium income than their larger peers.
These results are interesting since the regulators in Austria, Germany and Switzerland claim that the stringency of regulations is based on the riskiness and complexity of an insurer, not necessarily on its size. Our results suggest that the opposite might be true and at the very least the proportionality principle has not yet been properly implemented. Therefore, it might be worthwhile to revise existing regulation with respect to the risk sensitivity and, more important, to make sure that future regulation as Solvency II takes the proportionality principle into account.
This recommendation is in line, for example, with the Practitioner Panel (2013) which reports that financial companies in the UK ask for more thorough implementation of the proportionality principle.
Regarding the second hypothesis, results show that actual and perceived costs of regulation are lower for stock insurers than for mutuals. In this regard our results support the findings by Zanjani (2007) . The limited access to capital seems not to be the only disadvantage of mutuals but also the regulatory framework might deter insurance companies from choosing the organizational structure of a mutual. Further research should evaluate which specific regulations in addition to initial capital requirements are heavier burdens for mutuals than for stock companies. Similarly, regulators should review if some requirements cause competitive distortions between mutuals and stocks and if any organizational structure is preferable from a regulatory point of view.
Finally, the results show that Swiss insurers rate the perceived benefits of insurance regulation higher than their Austrian and German peers. Especially, when perceived costs and benefits are taken together into account Swiss insurers have a more positive view of regulation than Austrian and German insurers. Swiss insurers tend to be "balanced" in their perception and Austrian and German ones more "pessimistic". We attribute this to two reasons. First, the preparation process for Solvency II in the insurance sector in the European Union creates uncertainty and may lead to more pessimistic views on regulation. Second, the Swiss regulatory framework might be better than the one in the European Union in general. 40 Sass and Seifried, 2014) or simple solutions to systemic risk (see, e.g. Ashby, Peters and Devlin, 2014) . 41 See, for example, Holzmüller (2009) finds that Solvency II fulfills the criteria for capital requirements as stated by Cummins, Harrington and Niehaus (1994) . Furthermore, according to Ernst & Young (2011) it is likely that Solvency II leads to a reduced default probability of insurers, improved risk management and more transparency. In addition, economic growth is supported due to higher confidence in the insurance sector.
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